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IN THE SUPRE!IB COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, 
v. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
STERLING A. MEYER and 
JEANNE D. MEYER et ux., 
REESE HO\VELL, ESCROW AGENT 
and TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 14833 
This is an action for declaratory relief wherein Plaintiff 
seeks to have the Utah Statutory Dower provision, § 74-4-3 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), declared unconstitutional, both on 
its face and applied to the case at hand. 
1. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' Motion for SWTu-:iary Judgment in their favor 
was granted and an Order to that effect entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County on 
October 20, 1976. From the Order granting Summary Judgment, 
the Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Summary Judgment and 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law, on the ground tl~ 
the Utah Statutory Dower provision, § 74-4-3 Utah Code Anoo-
tated (1953) is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about November 1, 1973, Appellant, Plaintiff 
below, obtained a judgment from the Third Judicial District 
Court, Civil No. 210940, against nespondent, Defendant below, 
Sterling A. Meyer in the sum of $19,158.12. Respondent 
Jeanne D. Meyer, the wife of Sterling A. Meyer was not a party 
to that suit or judgment. 
2. At the time judgnent was entered, Respondents Sterlin: 
A. and Jeanne D. Meyer were the fee simple and/or benefic~l 
t' owners, as joint tenants, of a certain parcel of real proper 1 
2. 
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with a personal residence situated thereon, located at 176l 
South 2600 East, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. In accordance with § 78-22-1 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), upon docketing, said judgment became a lien upon all 
the real property owned by the Respondent Sterling A. Meyer 
located in Salt Lake County, including the parcel described 
above. 
4. On or about March 2, 1976, Respondents Sterling A. 
and Jeanne D. Meyer sold the above-described residence and 
placed the proceeds from the sale in escrow with the Respon-
dents Title Insurance Agency of Salt Lake City and Reese 
Howell as Escrow Agent. 
5. The Appellant thereafter served a Writ of Execution 
upon Respondents Title Insurance Agency and Howell, directing 
them to release said proceeds to Appellant. 
6. Respondents and each of them do not dispute that 
Appellant Boise Cascade Corporation is entitled by law to 
execute upon Respondent Sterling A. Meyer's 50 per cent share 
of the proceeds from the sale of the subject property and 
Appellant asserts no claim against Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer's 
50 per cent share of the proceeds from the sale of the subject 
property. 
7. Subsequent to the issuance of the Writ of Execution, 
Respondents and each of them refused to surrender up one-third 
3. 
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of Respondent Sterling A. Meyer's 50 per cent share of the 
proceeds from the sale of the subject property, on the 
ground 
that said one-third represented Jeanne D. M • 
dower under § 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated. 
·eyer s statutory 
8. Therefore, the sole and exclusive issue before the 
trial court and this Court is whether § 74-4-3 is consti~-
tional, thus allowing Respondents to withhold the above one-
third share from execution by Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A TOTALLY NEW CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HAS EMERGED IN 
THE LAST FIVE YEARS RENDERING ALL STATUTORY PROVISIONS RESULT-
ING IN DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS BASED UPON SEX TO BE 
VOID UNLESS SUPPORTED BY STRONG, COMPELLING AND LEGITIMATE 
JUSTIFICATION. 
The sole and single issue presented to the Court on this 
Petition for Appeal is whether § 74-4-3 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, generically known as Utah's statutory 
dower provision is unconstitutional per se or unconstitutional 
as applied. The statute in question provides as follows: 
74-4-3. WIFE'S INTEREST IN HUSBAND'S REAL PROPERTY. 
One-third in value of all the legal or equitable 
estates in real property possessed by the husba~d 
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife 
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be 
set apart as her property in fee s~mple, if she 
survives him; provided, that the wife shall not be 
4. 
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entitled to any interest under the provisions of 
this section in any such estate of which the hus-
band has made a conveyance when the wife, at the 
time of the conveyance, was not and never had been 
a resident of the territory or state of Utah. 
Property distributed under the provisions of this 
section shall be free from all debts of the dece-
dent except those secured by liens for work or 
labor done or material furnished exclusively for 
the improvement of the same, and except those 
created for the purchase thereof, and for taxes 
levied thereon. The value of such part of the 
homestead as may be set aside to the widow shall 
be deducted from the distributive share provided 
for her in this section. In cases wherein only 
the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent 
are interested, the property secured to the widow 
by this section may be set off by the court in 
due process of administration. [Emphasis added.] 
The statute clearly establishes a real property interest in a 
certain class of individuals based upon sex and sex alone. 
The statute here under examination creates a special property 
interest for females, takes away a certain real property 
interest from males and creates no similar or corresponding 
interest for males. 
The gravamen of Plaintiff's Appeal is founded upon the 
discriminatory treatment of a special classification of 
individuals which bears no rational nexus to any legitimate 
state interest. Such a statutory scheme has been ruled 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in a 
string of developing case authority commencing with the now 
famous or infamous case of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 
251, 30 L.Ed. 2d 225 (1971) and culminating most recently in 
Craig et. al. v. Boren, 45 Law Week 4057 (Dec. 20, 1976). 
5. 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that stQtutory 
classifications based on sex were "inherently suspect and 
thu; 
subject to close judicial scrutiny." Fronterio v. Richardsoc, 
411 U.S. 677, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed. 2d 583 (1973). 
It is Plaintiff's contention that the Utah statutory dow;: 
provision is violative of Due Process and Equal Protection a~ 
therefore repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States as well as Article I, 
Section 7 and Article IV, Section l of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. The following decisional authority lends 
direct support to that proposition: Reed v. Reed, supra; 
Fronterio v. Richardson, supra; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972); Pittsburg Press v. 
The Commission, 413 U.S. 3761 93 S. Ct. 2553, 37 L.Ed. 2d 
699 (1973); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 41 L.Ed. 2d 
256, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 40 
L.Ed. 2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 
U.S. 31, 42 L.Ed. 2d 790, 95 S. Ct. 704 (1975); Weinberger v. ' 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 43 L.Ed. 2d 514, 95 S. Ct. 1225 
(1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 95 
s. ct. 1373 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 
42 d 2d 690 (1975); Turner v. Department of S. Ct. 692, L.E . 
Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 96 S. Ct. 249, 46 L.Ed. 2a 
181 (1975); Chandlier v. Roudebush, U.S. 98 S. Ct. 
1949,, 48 L.Ed. 2d 416 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 45 L.W. 40 57 • 
December 20, 1976. 
6. 
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The fountain head case of Reed v. Reed decided in 
November 1971, was truly a landmark decision in the sense 
that al though the holding seemed innocuous enough at the time, 
it pressaged a spectacular development of constitutional law 
not seen since the Slaughter House Cases of 18721. 
The judicial development of the anti-sex discrimination 
doctrine announced in Reed is somewhat analogous to the 
erosion of the "privity of contract" doctrine in area of 
product liability beginning with McPhearson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) and culminating in an entirely new 
cause of action not previously existant. See Prosser, THE 
ASSAULT UPON THE CITADEL, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), and Prosser, 
THE FALL OF THE CITADEL, 78 YALE L.J. 1066 (1969). So it is 
with the sex discrimination cases; they have laid to rest some 
of the ernstwhile "archaic and overbroad generalizations"2 
concerning the sexes and created an entirely new concept in 
constitutional rights heretofore totally nonexistent. 
Reed itself was concerned only with an Idaho probate 
statute giving preference to males over females in granting 
letters of administration. The court found even a preference 
to be irrational and therefore unconstitutional as a denial of 
both Due Process and Equal Protection. 
y 16 ~vall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872) 
?./ 45 Law Week 4059; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 
(1975) 
7. 
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Reed was not thereafter confined to its facts. The 
following year in Frontiero v. Ric~ardso~, supra, the court 
held that an army nurse's husband could not constitutionally 
be treated differently as a dependent than a male f army o ficer', 
wife. The Frontiero decision was important as it established 
sex as a suspect classification along with race, religion, a~ 
national origin. 
In Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, the Supreme Court held the 
systematic exclusion of women from jury duty to be violative 
of inter alia the Equal Protection of the law. 
Later in 1975 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, the high 
Court held the Social Security Act's provision allowing sur-
vivors benefits to widow mothers with minor children, but not 
to widower fathers in the same situation was held violative 
of both Due Process and Equal Protection. 
In Stanton v. Stanton, supra, a 1975 case from Utah, a 
statute compelling a divorced father to support his male chiN 
to age 21 while permitting the father to terminate support for ' 
his female child at age 18 was held to be an unlawful denial 
of Equal Protection. 
A second case from Utah Turner v. Department of Employment 
Security, supra, decided in 1975, held a Utah statute making 
pregnant women ineligible for unemployment benefits for a 
period from 12 weeks before expected date of child birth until 
6 weeks after child birth to be violative of Due Process. 
8. 
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Most recently in Craig v. Boren, supra, the u.s. supreme 
Court struck down an Oklahoma state statute differentiating 
between males and females in the purchase of 3.2% beer holding 
the act did not "substantially further important governmental 
interests"and was therefore violative of equal protection. 
The foregoing summary is not exhaustive, but touches 
only upon some of the more significant decisions. A quick 
review of their holdings, however, makes it clear that the 
"Equal Rights Amendment" may already be in existency by judi-
cial fiat and that the frenetic efforts of the E.R.A. propon-
ents may be superfluous. 
Clearly one conclusion can be drawn from a collective 
reading of the above-cited cases, that being a statutory scheme 
drawing a distinction between classes of citizens based only 
on gender without strong justification cannot meet constitutional 
muster and must therefore be set aside. 
POINT II 
UTAH'S STATUTORY DOWER PROVISION § 74-4-3, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953), AS PRESENTLY CONSTRUED BY THE COURTS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS GRANTING A FEMALE A PROPERTY INTEREST 
IN THE REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY A MALE, WITHOUT PROVIDING FOR A 
CORRESPONDING INTEREST FOR THE MALE IN THE PROPERTY OF THE 
FEMALE, CREATES A STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION BASED ON SEX AND 
SEX ALONE, CONSTITUTES A "SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION" NOT SUPPORTED 
9. 
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BY ANY COMPELLING STATE INTEREST A01D IS, THEREFORE, VIOLATIVE 
OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FIFTH 
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, AS WELL AS ARTICLE IV, SECTION I OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTrlH. 
Turning now to the Utah Statute here challenged §74-4-3, 
set forth completely at page 4 supra this brief, the section 
clearly creates a gender based classification. It is now a 
well-settled principle of constitutional law that "classifica-' 
tions based on sex are inherently suspect and thus subject ~ 
the close and strict scrutiny" of the courts. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Frontiero v. Richard son, supra, while 
striking down a statutory provision which allowed increased 
benefits to a male member of the armed services with dependents 
but disallowing similar benefits for a female member with 
dependents, held per Justice Brennan: 
With these considerations in mind, we can only 
conclude that classifications based upon sex, 
like classifications based upon race, alienage, 
or national origin, are inherently suspect, and 
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by 
that stricter standard of review, it is clear 
that the statutory scheme now before us is 
constitutionally invalid. 411 U.S. at 688. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Equally settled in constitutional law is that in order 
for a suspect classification, here one based solely on sex, 
to withstand strict judicial scrutiny, it must be shown that 
the state has a compelling interest to protect by the statutory 
10. 
... 
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-classification. See e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u. s. 
618, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969). 
In the case at bar it cannot be doubted that § 74-4-3 
creates a classi£ication based on sex alone. In a very real 
way the statute commands "dissimilar treatment for men and 
women who are ... similarly situated." Reed v. Reed, supra. 
It further cannot be disputed that the state is without a 
compelling state interest which it is protecting by the statute. 
The statutory dower provision is a classic and paradigm example 
of the codification of "archaic and overbroad generalizations" 
which are now constitutionally impermissible. The original ver-
sion of §74-4-3 stems of course from ancient English common law, 
was first enacted in Utah in 1898 and has remained essentially 
unchanged since that day. See Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360 
88 P. 20 (1906). The provision was enacted in a day when 
women were looked on with an attitude of, as Justice Brennan 
stated it, "romantic paternalism." See Frontiero, supra, at 
684. At that stage of society's development women commonly 
did not have separate property or separate means of support, 
insurance benefits, social security or pension and profit 
sharing programs. Whereas, today women are just as likely to 
be able to support and maintain themselves as are men. More-
over, the conclusion that § 74-4-3 is violative of both the 
United states and the Utah Constitution is not only supported 
but practically inescapable under the following case authority 
in addition to those cases discussed above. Stanton v. Stanton, 
11. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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421 U.S. 7, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975); W · b ~ 
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 43 L.Ed. 2d 514, 95 s. Ct. 1225 
(1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 42 L.Ed. 2d 610 , 
95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 41 L.EG 
2d 256, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 
40 L.Ed. 2d 189, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974); Adoption of Walker, 
Pa. , 360 A. 2d. 603 (1976). 
POINT III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE, IT 
IS CLEAR THAT § 74-4-3 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE 
CASE AT HAND. 
The facts of the instant case show that the property to 
which Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer asserts her one-third dower 
interest was sold by both herself and her husband. By so doinc 
each party relinquished any and all rights he or she had to thE 
property. It is further undisputed that Respondent Sterling A. 
Meyer, the husband of Jeanne is presently alive. Under this 
set of facts it is clear that § 74-4-3 does not and was never 
intended to allow the wife to withhold one-third of the husband 
portion of the proceeds from the sale in which both spouses joi 
The statute clearly sets forth two conditions which must 
be met before the wife can claim her one-third interest. Secti 
§ 74-4-3 reads, in pertinent part: 
12. 
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One-thir~ in value of all the legal or equitable 
estates ~n real property possessed by the husband 
at any time during the marriage, to which the wife 
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be 
set ~part ~s her property in fee simple, if she 
survives him .... (Emphasis added.) 
The first condition precedent to the wife's taking one-
third is that she has not relinquished her rights to said 
property. In the case at hand, Respondent Jeanne Meyer has 
joined in a sale of said property to a third party. A more 
thorough and complete relinquishment of her dower rights can 
hardly be imagined. In In re ~adsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 
259 P. 2d 595, (1953) this court held that where a woman had 
joined in a contract for the sale of land owned by her husband, 
she had thereby "relinquished her inchoate right of dower in 
the real property covered by that contract." 259 P. 2d at 
603. See also In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 
P. 2d 1298 (1972). 
In addition, the statute requires that the wife survive 
the husband, before she is permitted to take her one-third 
portion. The fact of survival of the wife as a condition 
precedent to taking under § 74-4-3 is an established rule of 
law in Utah. In the seminal case of Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 
445, 199 Pac. 680, 683 (1921) the court stated unequivocally: 
While it is true that under our statute dower by that 
name is abolished and the wife takes one-third of her 
husband's real estate in fee if she survives him, yet 
unless she does survive him, she has no interest in 
his real estate. The interest of the wife, although 
in fee is nevertheless, a mere inchoate interest, 
and de~end~ entirely upon t~e.cond~tion_th~t she 
survive her husband. In joining with ~im in a deed 
of lands to which he holds the legal title she there-
fore merely releases her inchoate right . . . · 
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Finally, it is equally well established in the Utah law 
on dower interests that the interest of the wife is only in 
the real property itself and not in the proceeds from any sale 
or other disposition of the property. The landmark case enunci-
ating this rule is In re Park's Estate, 31 Utah 255, 87 Pac. 
900 (1906). There the wife attempted to retain one-third of 
her deceased husband's estate, clai~ing that he had conveyed 
certain property away to which she had not relinquished her 
dower interest. The Court, in affirming the trial court, ~N 
that the wife's only interest was in the real property itself 
and not in the proceeds from the husband's general estate. ~t. 
Court stated: 
We . • feel constrained to hold that the wife, 
if she desires to recover her interest in her 
husband's lands alienated by him during marriage, 
without her consent, must resort to the lands 
themselves . The interest of the wife is in 
the land itself to be apportioned to her one-third 
in value out of each parcel. 87 Pac. at 903. 
In the case at hand, Respondent Jeanne D. Meyer is not 
seeking her one-third from the land itself, but is seeking her 
one-third from the proceeds from the land. This,under Park, 
she is not permitted to do. 
The conclusion is inescapable. Not only did Respondent 
Jeanne Meyer relinquish her inchoate dower right by joining 
with her husband in a conveyance of the property to a third 
party, but she has not yet met the requirement of survival a~ 
she is seeking her dower from proceeds, not real property. 
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This being so, §74-4-3 is not authority for the withholding, 
by Respondents, of one-third of the husband's share of the 
proceeds. The application by the court below, of §74-4-3 to 
the facts of the case at hand clearly amounts to a denial of due 
process and renders the statute unconstitutional as applied. 
CmiCLUSION 
The case before the court on this appeal is not rendered 
moot because the Utah State Legislature has repealed the 
statutory dower provision with the adoption of the New Uniform 
Probate Code, as the new Probate Code does not take effect 
until July, 1977, and does not have retroactive application. The 
case before the court is important because it is a test case for 
a number of other similar cases where a debtor attempts to use the 
Dower Statute as a shield or defense from recovery of judgment 
by the husband's creditors. For this reason, the constitutional 
question here presented remains and is in great need of clarifi-
cation. 
Simply stated, Utah's Statutory Dower Provision, §74-4-3, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) creates a suspect classification based on sex 
which is not supportable by any compelling state interest and 
must therefore be held unconstitutional. The Summary 
Judgment granted by the court below, in favor of Appellees 
should be reversed and judgment entered, as a matter of law. 
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ih favor of Appellants. Finally the statute in this case has 
been applied to living parties where the wife herself has joine~ 
in the conveyance, such an application is irrational and not 
related to any legitimate state purpose as the dower right is 
inchoate and cannot take effect until the husband's death, and j; 
completely abrogated by her signature on the deed. The court's 
application of the statute to the facts present in the instant 
case lacks logical nexus and constitutes a denial of Due Process 
and the statute, even if constitutional on its face, is here u~ 
stitutional as applied. 
D NE R. SMIT 
of and for 
WATKISS & CA..~PBELL 
Twelfth Floor, 310 South Main St: 
salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Admitted by Motion for the 
purpose of this case only. 
I 
Attorneys for BOISE CASCADE CORP~ 
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